This paper identifies the lessons to be learned for the institutionalization of Safeguards by Design (SBD) from the Department of Energy (DOE) experience developing and implementing DOE-STD-1189 -2008 Integration of Safety into the Design Process. The experience is valuable because of the similarity of the challenges of integrating safety and safeguards into the design process. The paper reviews the content and development of DOE-STD-1189-2008 from its initial concept in January 2006 to its issuance in March 2008. Lessons learned are identified in the areas of the development and structure of requirements for the SBD process; the target audience for SBD requirements and guidance, the need for a graded approach to SBD, and a possible strategy for development and implementation of SBD within DOE.
Introduction and Purpose
This paper presents the lessons to be learned for the institutionalization of SBD from the DOE experience with the institutionalization of DOE-STD-1189-2008. The lessons learned were developed by reviewing 1) the institutional drivers and impediments to the development of DOE-STD-1189-2008, 2) the approach taken by DOE in the development and institutionalization of SBD, and 3) the experience of DOE contractors in implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008. These reviews included data collection from published sources and from interviews with people directly involved with the development, institutionalization, and application of DOE-STD-1189.
The paper presents conclusions and recommendations for policy makers (DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], or IAEA) responsible for managing the development and implementation of the SBD process based upon the DOE experience with DOE-STD-1189-2008. These conclusions and recommendations are intended to be applicable to a general SBD process. However, because the scope of this study was limited to DOE activities, additional confirmatory studies of similar activities, such as IAEA efforts to integrate safety with design and project management, would be beneficial to provide additional assurance that the conclusions are not distorted by unique aspects of the DOE environment. Additional detail about the bases for these recommendations and conclusions can be found in the report 1 that forms the basis of this paper.
As early as 2005, DOE senior management recognized the need to revise the DOE directives and guidance for project management for the acquisition of capital assets to provide "more complete description of safety expectations for early design steps." 2 The drivers for revision were analyses of the causes of cost and schedule overruns on large design and construction projects 3 and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) interest in the integration of safety into the design process. In December 2005, the DNFSB initiated a series of public meetings and hearings on the DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) incorporation of safety into the design and construction of defense nuclear facilities. In December 2005, the Deputy Secretary directed that actions to revise the project management directives and guidance to enhance integration of safety into design be initiated in January 2006 2 . By July 2006, DOE planned to include the requirements for integration of safety into the design process for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities into a new DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, which was scheduled to be issued in calendar year 2006 4 . However, the development of the standard required more time than anticipated, and the draft of DOE-STD- Reasons that the development, review, and approval of DOE-STD-1189-2008 required more time than anticipated are discussed below in the lessons learned. However, it is important to realize that the internal drivers (i.e., the perceived impact of safety integration deficiencies on project cost and schedule) and external drivers (DNFSB monitoring of DOE progress) for integration of safety into design were much stronger than the corresponding drivers for institutionalizing SBD appear to be. DOE senior management was so strongly committed to the development and institutionalization of DOE-STD-1189-2008 that the effort could not be permitted to fail. 1 Since this level of support and commitment may not currently exist for institutionalizing SBD, it is important to avoid potential missteps like the ones that delayed the institutionalization of DOE-STD-1189-2008.
Lessons Learned
The lessons to be learned from the development and implementation of DOE-STD-1189-2008 are divided into two categories. The first relates to content and presentation of the integration approach mandated in DOE-STD-1189-2008. The second category relates to the DOE experience in implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008, including the institutional development and approach taken to securing Departmental review and approval of DOE-STD-1189-2008. Both of these aspects of the institutionalization of the requirements for the integration of safety into the design process provide potentially useful lessons for the institutionalization of SBD.
The review of the requirements for integration of safety into the design process and their presentation in DOE-STD-1189-2008 identified the following good practices:
 Mandatory Early Establishment of Expectations and Review of Approach by
Owner / Regulator. One of the major changes instituted by DOE-STD-1189-2008 is the requirement for DOE to provide early direction in three important aspects of safety in design. DOE is required to document its expectations regarding the formality and rigor of activities to integrate safety into design before conceptual design begins. DOE reviews and approves a safety design strategy prepared by the project early in conceptual design. DOE reviews and approves a conceptual design safety report prepared at the end of conceptual design 6 .
 Mandatory Early Participation by Subject Matter Experts and Establishment of
Integration Mechanism. DOE-STD-1189-2008 requires the project team to establish, during the early part of conceptual design, an interdisciplinary team, referred to as the Safety Design Integration Team (SDIT), which includes nuclear safety subject matter experts, experts from other disciplines, and design leads. The SDIT is responsible for activities to ensure that safety is integrated into design, including overseeing the preparation of the project's nuclear safety deliverables, such as the safety design strategy and the conceptual safety design report 6 .
 Mandatory Early Planning and Graded Approach for Safety. The requirements discussed above for early establishment of safety in design expectations by the owner / regulator, for development of a safety design strategy and its early approval by the regulator and for early participation by subject matter experts, ensure that safety requirements are included early in project planning. DOE-STD-1189-2008 also t permits projects to use the documented safety design strategy to tailor the application of the requirements for integration of safety into design based upon the complexity and hazard of the facility. 2 This approach helps ensure that the DOE-STD-1189-2008 approach can be applied cost effectively across the broad spectrum of DOE facilities 6 .
 Conservative Risk Management Approach. DOE-STD-1189-2008 requires that the project risks associated with safety issues are identified early and incorporated into overall project risk management 6 . It also seeks to foster a risk management approach in which these risks are managed by taking a very conservative approach toward the design of safety measures early in design and, where the design evolution or safety research permits, the conservatism is relaxed as the design progresses 8 . This approach is intended to ensure that most of the surprises associated with implementation of safety measures later in the design are pleasant ones, resulting in cost and schedule savings. However, this is one area where the approach mandated by DOE-STD-1189-2008 has not been as effective as its authors intended 8 . Thus, it may be worthwhile to see whether approaches other than those analogous to the DOE-STD-1189 requirements in this area might be more effective for SBD.
 Identification of Key Project Interfaces That Affect Safety Design Decisions. DOE-STD-1189-2008 provides a discussion of the key project interfaces that affect decisions on safety strategies and measures in Chapter 7 6 . Section 7.8 specifically addresses the interfaces and interactions with security, which is used in DOE-STD-1189-2008 in a manner that would include international safeguards, where required for a DOE facility. A similar discussion would be valuable for SBD guidance or requirements so that safeguards subject matter experts could be alerted to project decisions that could affect the selection and effectiveness of safeguards measures.
 Identification of the End of Conceptual Design as the Key Point Where Basic Design
Approaches and Parameters Need to Be Established. As the preceding discussion shows, the DOE-STD-1189-2008 requirements establish the end of conceptual design as the point where the designers have identified and evaluated the hazards associated with the proposed facility, identified the major safety functions necessary to provide adequate protection, identified safety structures, systems, and components (SSC), on a preliminary basis, and identified the major standards that these SSC will need to meet 6 . This is extremely important because the decisions made during conceptual design commit as much as 80% of the total life-cycle costs 9 . Use of this approach in SBD would require the IAEA and State regulatory authorities to modify their regulatory approach to provide for earlier submittal and review of facility design information and safeguards measures because under the approach review of this information typically does not begin until near the end of final design (i.e., about the start of construction).
The review of the requirements for integration of safety into the design process and their presentation in DOE-STD-1189-2008 identified the following areas for improvement:
 Presentation of Requirements. Some of the statements in DOE-STD-1189-2008 that have been interpreted by DOE and others as requirements are not clearly identified as requirements. For example, Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluations are only mentioned, in Table 7 -1 of DOE-STD-1189-2008 6 , as a typical action completed the end of preliminary design, without any specific mention of them in the standard's discussion of criticality safety or any specific format and content requirements in DOE orders or standards. However, this statement has been interpreted as a requirement for preparation of Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluations by the end of preliminary design and the related incorporation of criticality safety evaluation results in hazard analyses, which was frequently missed in contractor attempts to implement DOE-STD-1189-2008 8 . The lesson to be learned from this example is that SBD requirements should be clearly stated and that supporting guidance should be provided in either SBD requirements document or supporting documents prepared as a part of the institutionalization of SBD 11 . This approach helped ensure that the DOE-STD-1189-2008 requirements could be implemented cost effectively and provided a constituency for DOE-STD-1189-2008 within the DOE contractor community. The development and instutionalization of an SBD process for DOE contractors will be much more likely to succeed if it is developed employing a similar process. When discussing this problem, Brad Evans commented, "Maybe we should have titled the standard 'Integration of Safety into Project Management'." 11 As a result, when the draft DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued for review and comment it had very little input from experienced project managers and virtually no constituency in the DOE contractor project management community. As a result, the review, comment, and resolution process for DOE-STD-1189-2008 required nearly a full year and resulted in substantive changes to the process for integrating safety into design.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The review of the DOE experience in developing and implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008 led to the following recommendations for policy makers regarding the development and institutionalization of SBD within DOE. The priority, implementation difficulty, and recommended time frame for implementation (e.g., short term, intermediate term, or long term) is listed after each recommendation.
 SBD process requirements documents should be developed jointly by DOE staff and the DOE contractor community. The DOE contractor community can be most effectively engaged through the EFCOG working groups (i.e., the safeguards and security working group and the project management working group). It is most effective to provide these working groups with a broad outline of the need and let them fill in the details of the SBD process rather than to fund more detailed SBD process development by groups of safeguards experts. [High priority, easy to implement, near term]
 Despite the use of the term design in SBD, the primary audience for SBD requirements and guidance documents is the project managers who will implement SBD. If SBD is to be institutionalized within DOE, the DOE project management community must see its value. SBD documents for designers should focus on providing a "tool kit" of design approaches that would be acceptable to the IAEA (e.g., international documents analogous to DOE guides or NRC regulatory guides). [High priority, easy to implement, near term]
 The key element of SBD is the early establishment of expectations for integration of safeguards into design (at both the pre-conceptual and conceptual design stages) and the early negotiation of proposed safeguards approaches and measures between the project and the IAEA and State regulatory agency. The basic safeguard approaches and measures need to be agreed upon before the beginning of preliminary design. (That is, an agreed upon approach should be a requirement for CD-1 approval within the DOE project management process.) Implementation of this SBD element will drive projects to engage safeguards issues and employ safeguards subject matter experts (SMEs) early in the design process. Implementation of this SBD element will also require a change in the negotiation process and development of additional guidance by the IAEA and State regulatory agency.
[High priority, difficult to implement, long term]
 The SBD requirements must permit tailoring of the SBD process to reflect safeguards risk, facility type and complexity, and the maturity of safeguards approaches for the specific design (e.g., whether the design is an evolution of an existing design for which effective safeguards measures have been developed or a revolutionary design requiring research and analysis to identify effective safeguards approaches and develop the requisite equipment). The universe of facilities being designed and constructed is large and a one-size-fits-all approach will not work.
 Because of the small number of DOE facilities on the Eligible Facilities List and the even smaller number that are actually selected for IAEA safeguards, there is very little interest in a SBD process that addresses only IAEA safeguards within the DOE contractor community. It is doubtful that such a process could be institutionalized in DOE. However, there is great interest in the DOE contractor community in an integrated process that addresses DOE requirements for special nuclear material protection (i.e., PP, MC&A, and security) in the design and construction of facilities. 10 International safeguards by design could piggy back on the development and implementation of such a process, sponsored by HSS or another DOE Headquarters organization, at little cost.
[Intermediate priority, difficult to implement, intermediate term]
 The SBD process requirements documents should be structured to clearly identify all requirements and to identify the key project interfaces that affect design decisions related to safeguard approaches, measures, and performance. Technical guidance supporting the SBD process should be prepared by experienced safeguards SMEs. 1 [Intermediate priority, difficult to implement, long term]
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